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INTRODUCTION
The most disastrous oil spill the western hemisphere has ever
witnessed occurred during the 10 months between June 1979 and March
1980, when the experimental well IXTOC I blew out off the coast of
Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. The beaches of Mexico's eastern shore
suffered the heaviest contamination from the spill while containment
efforts and fortunate weather saved the united states' Gulf Coast from
the severe contamination many feared, but the combination of dirty
beaches and media coverage brought about many tragic economic impacts.
The disaster's effects on South Texas virtually destroyed a year's
earnings for the region's tourism industry and cut into the profits of
many commercial fishermen. On seeking to recover their losses through
legal actions, these businessmen and the governments of Texas and the
United States found themselves caught in the gap between domestic and
international legalities. The United States courts found their juris-
diction severely limited since the accident was brought about by
Mexicans, while the State Department found no adequate footing in
international law from which to claim financial liability against the
Mexican concerns involved. Though not entirely concluded, the litiga-
tion to date has left the marine interests of South Texas and the
United States Government badly under-compensated for their economic
losses. The case bears scrutiny both as an object lesson in the
sudden and dire consequences of even so little contamination and as an
indicator of major loopholes in our pollution liability laws that need
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to be filled. The activities at the well that caused the blowout and
subsequent spill, the effects of the oil on Texas' Gulf Coast, and the
legal attempts to recover against losses suffered as a result of the
spill will be examined.
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I. At the weIll
The platform
The drilling platform designated Sedco 135 was built by the
Ingalls Shipyard of Pascagoula, Mississippi in 1965, under contracts
from the Southeastern Dr ill ing Company, Inc. (Sedco). I t was a 3,527
ton semi-submersible rig with 3 cylindrical caissons for buoyancy
while floating or columnar support while resting on the sea floor. A
drawing of the platform is provided as Figure 1.
Upon taking delivery of the platform, Sedco attained all licen-
sing and inspections required by the U.S. Coast Guard to place it in
service as a merchant vessel in the domestic trade. After 5 years'
service in the Gulf of Mexico, Sedco 135 was chartered by foreign
concerns, requiring a modification to its license, and towed to coas-
tal west Africa in late 1970 for extended drilling operations. with
the rig in foreign waters when the initial Certificate of Inspection
expired, re-inspection requirements were waived by the Coast Guard and
a temporary Certificate of Registry was issued for the platform in
1971. In 1975, Sedco 135 returned to the Americas and was placed in
service to a charterer drilling off Trinidad. In May 1978, a third
foreign charter was approved by the U.S. Department of Commerce, this
to Perferaciones Marinas del Golfo (Permargo), a Mexican drilling
concern under contract to Petroleos Mexicanos (pemex), the nation-
alized Mexican oil company. The bareboat charter went into effect in
the summer of 1978 and dri 11 ing commenced December 1 of that year on
the first exploratory well, designated IXTOC I by the Mexicans.
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Figure 1: Sedco 135
CAISSCl'l
..........e-r:
From Richard E. Ford, USCG, Investigation on "Semi-submersible
drill barge SEDCO 135, O.N. 298297; IXTOC-1 well blowout with
subsequent fire in the Bay of Campeche, Mexico, in position 19-24N,
92-12W, on 3 June 1979 without personnel injuries, but with major
oil pollution.", u.S. Coast Guard serial 16732/3104/REF of 23 April
1981, p.3 .
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Drilling Operations
To fully understand the events leading to the blowout of IXTOC I,
a brief explanation of some procedures and terminology used in
offshore drilling will be required.
To drill a deep well, hollow piping is used as the stem between
the platform and the drilling bit. A bit with larger diameter than
the piping is attached to a collar, also of larger outside diameter,
at the lower end of the drill string. Ninety (90) foot sections of
pipe are added as needed by raising one end of the new section to the
crown block at the top of the platform's derrick and threading the
lower end into the drill string just above the rotary kelly table at
the platform's main deck. Piping of decreasing diameter is sunk into
the earth to various depths and drilling continues with a smaller bit
through the existing casing, making a telescoping drill string as
shown in Figure 2. To clean the cutting faces of the bit, a ready-mix
mud compound of proper consistency is pumped down the interior of the
pipe string, through openings in the center of the bit, and back up
the hole around drill string in a continuous flow, as illustrated in
Figure 3.
Notice that there is nothing but drilling mud blocking the escape
of oil through the drill string should it be encountered unexpectedly.
For this purpose, a Blowout Preventer stack is installed below the
kelly table; at the sea floor in the case of an offshore well. This
equipment has two basic elements, each provided in triplicate for U.S.
5
Figure 2: IXTOC I Casing Strings
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certification as in the case of Sedco 135. The ram shears cut through
the pipe string and seal it shut when their explosive propellant is
fired; the annular preventer wedges into the space between the drill
string and the outermost casing to block the oil's escape there, also
using explosive propellant. See Figure 4.
The Blowout
The IXTOC I well, as planned by Pemex, was to be a geological
exploration to a depth of 18,044 feet. The site was in the Bay of
Campeche, off Yucatan, at 19 0 24.5' N, 92 0 12.5' W, where the water
depth is approximately 160 feet. See Figure 5.
By the first of June, 1979, the drilling had reached 11,792 feet,
where a seven (7) inch diameter casing ended and a six (6) inch bit on
3 1/2 inch drill pipe was used to drill out the cement plug at the
bottom of the casing and continue to greater depths. During the June
1 drilling operations, three losses of mud circulation occurred,
requiring retraction to the bottom of the 7" casing at 11,792 feet.
After the first two losses, circulation was restored by adding mud and
some specially designed lost circulation materials. In trying to
stabilize the well after the third loss, the onboard supply of mud
compounds was exhausted. At this point, Mr. John Merrel, the senior
of seven Sedco advisors constantly on the platform, recommended that
the well be filled with sea water and observed for a period of several
days. Based on their experience in the vicinity of the site and
8
Figure 4: Blowout Preventer (Schematic)
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geologists' assurances that no oil was expected in the formation that
had been reached, Pemex, the final authority on operational matters,
instead ordered the drill string withdrawn and the bit checked. On
the night of June 2, the extraction of the string began. pressure
readings in the string were carefully monitored and seemed to indicate
a dropping mud pressure and no building oil pressure in the well. At
approximately three o'clock in the morning on June 3, the last stand
(90 feet) of drill piping was being removed on the platform, placing
the outsized drill collar in the blowout preventer stack on the sea
floor. An unexpected surge of pressure from the well cross-threaded
the piping being removed and jammed the disconnecting wrenches in
place. A second, stronger surge blew mud followed by oil out the top
of the string at the crown block and through the cross-threaded joint.
with the wrenches jammed, the string could not be dropped back into
the hole to clear the blowout preventer stack of the drill collar and
the ram shears could not cut through the outsized collar when fired.
At 0315, the escaping oil and gas caught fire and by 0330 the platform
was abandoned as out of control.
Two supply vessels stood by for eight hours pumping water onto
the burning rig, but the flames enveloping Sedco 135 made attempts to
extinguish the fire futile. The derrick and much of the equipment
stored on the platform collapsed onto the blowout pre venter at mid-
morning, but the anchors held the floating caissons fast. At noon,
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the anchor chains were ordered cut, a process that took 24 hours. The
platform was then towed 30 miles northwest of the well site and boar-
ded by 11 marine surveyors. After a week of inspections, Sedco 135
was declared a total loss, towed further into the Gulf of Mexico, and
scuttled.
The Spill
The initial rate of flow from the unattended well was estimated
by most creditable sources as 30,000 barrels/day (1,260,000
gallons/day) for the first two months of the spil1 2• Red Adair's
attempts to clear the blowout pre venter shears and reclose them
reduced the flow for only a few hours, as the collapse of the platform
had knocked over the Blowout preventer column. The flow rate was not
significantly reduced until mid-August, when Pemex pumped thousands of
steel and lead balls into the well, bringing the rate to 10,000
barrels/day.3 During this month, the U.S. Coast Guard lent its
support at Pemex's request and realized a maximum flow of 5,000
barrels/day through several weeks. In mid-September, the Coast Guard
withdrew when Pemex installed an inverted "sombrero" collector over
the well. 4 After the collector, as illustrated in Figure 6, was in
place, an engineering consultant from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Mr. Jerome Milgram, visited the well and estimated the
device to be 90% effective in collecting natural gas, but only 10%
effective in controlling the escape of crude oil. He also placed the
12
leakage rate at that time as high as 50,000 barrels/day.5 By the end
of February, 1980, two relief wells had been completed and Mexican
authorities claimed the leakage rate to be less than 2,000
barrels/day,6 and on March 5, 1980, the New York Times reported the
flow rate as negligible and capping operations nearing completion.?
14
II. On The Beach
The Slicks8
Though light lines of tar balls appeared on Texas beaches on
August 6, 1979, they weathered away quickly. On August 13, however,
the oil coverage began building (see Figures 7-9). There was light
oiling as far north as Aransas Pass by August 17. The first heavy
oiling occurred on South Padre Island on August 24. By August 26, U.S.
Coast Guard personnel had placed 11 oil-absorbant booms across Brazos-
Santiago Pass, six booms across Mansfield Pass, five booms across
Aransas Pass, and three across Cedar Bayou. The heaviest impacts were
felt between August 29 and September 1, when the levels of oil on
Texas beaches reached 3,900 metric tons. No new oil was observed
arriving on the beaches after September 1 and the pollution already
present began to weather. By September 14, coverage was uniformly
light and a tropical depression that hit during the next week reduced
it further. Mousse patches found along most of North and South Padre
Islands' beaches during October were broken up or buried by clean-up
crews. The oil-absorbant booms prevented any serious contamination of
the Laguna Madre, though minor impacts were observed at some sites.
Wi Idl ife Damage
Due to the relatively short period of heavy oiling, the protec-
tion of the Laguna Madre, and the natural resilience of the resources
of the area, damage to South Texas' marine wildlife from IXTOC I was
lighter than most had expected. In its 1981 summary of biological
studies, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
15
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From U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation and Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Campeche Oil Spill. Hearings before joint committee. 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., sere 96-66, 5 December 1979, p.93
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F~gure 7: O~1~ng of south Texas beaches. 17-20 August 1979
17 AUG 1979 18 AUG 1979 20 AUG 1979
I
N
,
S H 0 RELINE OIL OFFSHORE OIL
[,:::::1 VE.RY LIGHT
1:<.:.:.':1 LIGHT
b- BOOM
I::::: MODERATE ~ SHEEN
• H~AVY ~~1'J MOUSSE.
c- CLEMWP OPERATlON5
From Craig H. Hooper, ed., The IXTOC I Oil Spill: The Federal
Scientific Response, NOAA Special Report (Washington~c.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, December 1981) p.42
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Figure 8: Oilihg of south Texas beaches, 21 Aug-1 Sept 1979
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Figure 9: Oiliftg of south Texas beaches, 4 Sept-II Oct 1979
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listed the results of survey after survey as minor or insignificant.
I nthe i n 1 e t sand 1 ago 0 n s, the 0 n 1 y s i g n i f i can t 0 i 1 impact 0 b s e r ved
was the oiling of a marsh for 10 days, which " ••• did not immediately
inhibit photosynthesis or respiration of representative nearshore
plankton samples and seagrasses." 9 On the sand beaches, NOAA found
that the migratory birds instinctively avoided the more heavily oiled
beaches, and "Ground observations of wading and shorebirds indicated
that the oiled birds never exceeded 10%, peaking during periods of
heaviest oiling. 1I 1 0 Though populations of crabs and other beach
infauna were significantly reduced along the intertidal zones, it was
pointed out that lilt was difficult to distinguish the effects of the
oil spill from natural factors, especially storms and natural population
variations." l l Furthermore, " r e s ults of acute toxicity tests,
conducted on subtidal amphipods and zooplankton, suggested that IXTOC
I oil was not toxic to these species." l 2 Toxicity tests on redfish,
sea trout, and brown shrimp, the major fisheries species in the area,
indicated no acute toxicity' to adults, but high mortality and
deformity rates in juvenile and larval populations. 1 3 In the actual
fisheries, however, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) organoleptic tests did not find any
seafood unfit for the market in representative samples, both oiled and
clean. 1 4 Offshore populations renewed themselves quickly. Marine
biologist Henry Hildebrand, testifying before Congress, said that,
19
"These organisms (offshore species) have tremendous reproductive capa-
city. Nearly everyone we have on this coast does, because we have a
very severe environment in this part of Texas."15
Concern with long term subtoxic effects was expressed in all of
the studies reported and expert testimony before Congress, but most
would by now agree with Linda Garmon's sources in the October 25, 1980
Science News,
••• the overall environmental impact of IXTOC I will take
years to evaluate. Still, some researchers already say
the Gulf of Mexico seems back to normal. 'If you go to
the beaches of South Padre Island today' said ACS Oil spill
Symposium participant Edward B. Overton, 'you'll find good
swimming and good fishing.' Although it looks like 'the
end of the world' on the biiches during an oil spill, 'the
environment springs back.'
Economic Damages
The economic damages to South Texas from the spill are difficult
to quantify. As in any such disaster, the effects of the oil were not
confined to the sea. Governmental costs were assessed by totalling
monies spent to protect the Laguna Madre, clean the beaches, study the
spill, and assist the local maritime industries, but the costs to the
private sector were hidden in business losses.
The fishing industry is very important to South Texas, with
commercial fishermen having landed $125 million worth of catches in
the region in 1978. The estimated value of the catch taken in bays
and estuaries within the spill region in 1978 was $4.5 million.17
NMS and FDA programs worked through the fall of 1979 and the spring of
20
1980 to keep fishermen advised of the oil's whereabouts and to bolster
consumer confidence in the Gulf's seafood,18 but the small losses in
catch levels and wholesale prices came at the expense of relocation
and aggravation for many fishermen.
The deepest economic impact was felt by the area's tourist
industry. Expenditures for tourist-related activities on Texas' coast
were placed at $445 million in 1972,19 and the industry had certainly
grown since. Though South Padre Island was heavily oiled for only a
few weeks, the region's resort owners, charter boat operators, and
Chambers of Commerce fought tremendous public relations battles. The
media coverage of the spill simply did not create an image conducive
to beach vacations during the summer of 1979. As the New york Times
reported on August 11 of that year,
At South Padre Island itself, civic leaders have been angered
by what they say are misleading reports of the situation.
They especially criticize the television reports that, they
say, make it look as if the beaches here are the heavily pol-
luted Mexican beaches. They say that hurt more than the oil. 20
Although Representative Kika de la Garza quoted a partial list of
constituents' losses in his testimony before a subcommittee of the
House Public Works and Transportation Committee on September 26,
1979,21 the best indicator available is probably the legal claims made
by various private concerns for some $350 million in damages. Coupled
with suits from the governments of the United States and the State of
Texas, these claims boosted the costs of the spi 11 to South Texas, as
claimed in court, to nearly $400 million.
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III. Before The Courts
Domestic Legislation
The history of federal pollution liability and compensation
legislation in the united States shows an interesting progression.
See Table 1. In 1851, when the first law broaching the subject was
passed, little concern was felt for pollution. The encouragement of
seagoing commerce was the major concern of Congress and, as such, the
Limitation of Liability Statutes2 2 stipulated that no vessel owner
would be liable for any amount greater than the value of his vessel.
By 1924, some interest in the preservation of our harbors and
waterways had surfaced, and the discharge of oil, intentional or
otherwise, was made illegal within the territorial waters of the
united States under the Oil Pollution Act 23 of that year. The only
liability assumed by a violator of that law, however, was a fine $500
to $2500. This prohibition was extended to 50 nautical miles from our
coasts by the 1961 Oil Pollution Act 24, but the concept of oil pollu-
tion prevention by simple prohibition lasted nearly 50 years. The
first provisions dealing with tort liabilities in marine pollution
appeared in the 1970 Water Quality Improvement Act 25, indicating a
change in federal policy. This law established the maximum liability
of a tanker owner at $100 per ton or $14 mi 11 ion and placed the
liability limit for offshore platforms at $8 million. Along with
amendments to the existing Federal Water Pollution Control Act 26, the
Water Quality Improvement Act (WQIA) established a liability on the
part of the tanker owner and the offshore dr iller for damage done to
22
Table 1: Legislation Concerning Liability
and Compensation for Oil Pollution
Liabilitv Compensation
Offshore Tax Fund
Year Act Ship Platform Levied Limit
1851 Limitation of Vessel ---- ---- ----
Liability Act Value
1924 Oil Pollution Act $500 to ---- ---- ----
$2500
1948 Water Pollution ---- ---- ---- ----
Control Act
1961 Oil Pollution Act $500 to ---- ---- ----
$2500
1966 Oil Pollution Act $500 to ---- ---- ----
$2500
1970 Water Quality $100/ton $8m ---- $35m
Improvement Act to $14m
1972 Federal Water $100/ton $8m ---- $35m
Pollution Control to $14m
Act Amendments
1973 Oil Pollution Act $500 to ---- ---- ----
Amendments $2500
1973 Trans-Alaska $14m $100m 5¢/bbl $100m
Pipeline
Authorization Act
1974 Deepwater Port Act $150/ton ---- 2¢/bbl $100m
to $20m
1977 Clean Water Act $150/ton ---- ---- $35m
to $250k
1978 Outer Continental $300/ton $35m 3¢/bbl $200m
Shelf Lands Act
Amendments
1981 H.R. 85 (Proposed) $300/ton $50m 1. 3¢/bbl $375m
Condensed from: Neal Shapiro, "Oil Pollution Liability and
Compensation:, Marine Technology Society
Journal 16 (January 1982) 25
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other marine activities or the environment. Monies were set aside for
compensation of damages exceeding the limits established under the
laws, with the funds, not to exceed $35 million, appropriated annually
from the federal budget. Yet another new concept found voice in three
further laws: the 1973 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act 27, the 1974
Deepwater Port Act 28, and the 1978 outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments 29• The framers of these laws instituted taxes on the
petroleum products transported through their subject domains to fill
the coffers of the compensation funds. Though the taxes are only a
small percentage of the value of the oil, the maximum levy being $.05
per barrel, compensation limits rose to $200 million under this
scheme. A large fund also allows quicker compensation for damages, as
the government can be seen as an insurer, in effect, paying claims
from the fund and itself prosecuting for damages. Although the
concept of user fees has been highly praised by all concerned, no
comprehensive fund has been established to this day. Though an
accident in domestic drilling would have afforded some compensation
under the law, the lack of such a comprehensive law left South Texas'
damaged parties to their own devices in court.
In summary, domestic legislation does not provide suffi-
cient relief from the damage caused by a blowout on the
high seas. The Limitation of Liability Act remains in
effect, arguably vitiating the provisions of more recent
statutes such as the FWPCA and the OCSLA. Although the
latter acts are intended to compensate victims of oil
spills, they overlap, and their jurisdiction is restric-
ted to two hundred miles offshore ••• hence, none of ~he
parties can rely on existing legislation for relief O.
24
International Law
The body of international law agreed upon between the united
States and Mexico unfortunately provides little recourse to claimants
of damages from transnational pollution. Gerhard von Glahn, in his
book, Law Among Nations, takes the direction of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice in defining the sources of
international law, stating that,
Article 38 of the Statute directs the International Court
of Justice to apply: (1) international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recog-
nized by the contesting states; (2) international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
and (4) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists (writers) of various na5ions as subsidiary means
for determination of rules of law.
The International Maritime Organization of the United Nations
maintains two international conventions dealing with vessel source
pollution liability: the 1969 International Convention on civil Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution Damage 32 and the 1971 Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollu-
tion Damage 3 3, which provide liberal compensation for such damages as
were suffered in Texas. The IXTOC I platform, however, did not fall
under their definitions. "Ship" as subject to these conventions,
••• means any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever, and
any seaboarne craft carrying oil in bulk, but does not
include any warship or other ship owned or operated EY ~
State a~d used ~or ~~e time being only on government non-
cornrnerclal serVlce.
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The issue of pollution liability is contemporary and formative
enough that few questions were raised of customary international law
to cover u.s. claims.
The concept of sic utero tuo (" on e must so use his own as not to
do injury to another") as elaborated in the 1972 stockholm Declaration
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 35 and tort
liability provisions in the Federal Civil Code of the Republic of
Mexic0 3 6 were cited as applicable principles of law by claimants, but
no specific compensation requirements appear in either reference,
allowing Mexico an out.
As for judicial decisions, many writers cited the 1905 Trail
Smelter Arbitration37 between the united states and Canada, wherein
Canada was held liable for damages to u.s. interests as a result of
air pollution from a privately owned and operated smelter located in
British Columbia, as a precedent 38• The analogy to the IXTOC claims
was, in fact, a very good one but Mexico responded by reiterating
previous claims against the United states for salt-spoiled farmlands
on the southern shores of the Rio Grande.
It is important to note that, though a case may be made for
Mexican liability on the strength of general principles of law and a
previous International Court of Jus~ice decision, the lack of specific
treaty law and the absence of a specifically agreed upon compromis
between the United States and Mexico made adjudication by the Inter-
national Court of Justice impossible. Few wondered that Mexico did
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not agree to such. As Karl E. Meyer pointed out in his October, 1979
editorial "What Mexico Remembers,"
••• the Mexican president says there will be no compsenation.
Did the United States, he wonders, compensate Mexico for the
ruination of the Mexicali Valley by the Colorado River's saline
water? It did not.
A less recent episode, however, yields deeper explanation
for Mexico's resentment. American and European oil companies
once made huge compensation claims against Mexico. The Mexi-
can government was eventually forced to pay about $130 million
for assets it had seized-but only after enduring a punishing
boycott by the oil companies 3 9 •
The settlement to which Mr. Meyer refers was paid in 1941, but its
memory returned with a vengeance in 1979.
Litigation
The attempts to recover losses suffered as a result of IXTOC I's
blowout were initiated in the united States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, where the first suits were filed during
September and October of 1979. On September 13, a class action suit
was filed by a group of fishermen seeking $155 million in damages. 40
This suit was joined by other private commercial interests through the
next year and by early 1983 the claims had risen to $350 million. 41
The State of Texas filed suit on October 19 to recover $10 million in
clean-up costs and public expenditures. 42 The united States govern-
ment sued on October 24, setting its claim at $6 million. 43 The
respondants named in all three suits were Sedco, Permargo, and Pemex.
The obvious and overriding obstacle to u.S. claims was
jurisdiction. The accident occurred in Mexican waters; the drilling
27
was financed entirely by a Mexican corporation (and a nationalized
one, at that); and the purpose of the project was exploration, not
production. Sedco 135 was owned by a Texas corporation, but Sedco,
Inc. quickly moved to limit its liability under the 1851 Limitation of
Liability Act. The motion by plaintiffs seeking jurisdiction over
Permargo and Pemex in District Court was based on Texas' long-arm
statute44, which provides in part that,
Any foreign corporation, association, joint stock company •••
that engages in business in this State ••• and does not main-
tain a regular place of business in this state or a desig-
nated agent upon whom service of process may be made upon
causes of action arising out of such business done in the
State, the act or acts of engaging in such business ••• shall
be deemed equivalent to an appointment ••• of the Secretary
of State of Texas as agent upon whom service of process may
be made in any action, suit or proci~dings arising out of
such business done in this State •••
Pemex immediately moved for exemption, claiming itself an agent of the
Mexican government and thereby immune from tort liability under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 4 6• Permargo also attempted to
deny the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, claiming that its business
ties with Texas were insufficient to satisfy the long-arm statute.
In a preliminary ruling on March 30, 1982, District Court Judge
O'Conor delineated liabilities in the face of these motions and
virtually dashed the plaintiffs' hopes of recovering their full
losses. Pemex's plea of sovereign immunity was upheld over attempted
invocation of exceptions listed in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, as Judge O'Conor held that,
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Pemex, in this case, was executing a national plan formu-
lated at the highest levels of the Mexican government by
exploring for Mexico's natural resources. Any act perfor-
med by a subordinate of Pemex in futherance of this explor-
ation plan was still discretionary in nature and immune from
suit under the FSIA. To deny immunity to a foreign state
for the implementation of its domestic economic policies
would be to completely abrogate the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity b~ allowing an exception to swallow the
grant of immunity ••• 7
In the matter of Permargo's liability, Judge O'Conor denied the motion
for dismissal due to lack of jursidcition, stating that,
Here, the Court has determined that Permargo has availed it-
self of the benefits and laws of this forum and that Court
may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction with
respect to the private and public plaintiffs' direct claims
against Permargo. Sedco, like the direct plaintiffs, has
served Permargo pursuant to (the long-arm statute). Since
Sedco seeks to recover over against Permargo for claims
arising from the alleged maritime tort made the basis of
the direct plaintiffs' claims, this Court finds that it is
amenable to service of process under the Texa~ long-arm
statute for the reasons previously discussed. 8
As for Sedco's liability, Judge O"Conor upheld the motion seeking
exoneration under the Limitation of Liability Act. To plaintiffs'
complaints that the law was outmoded, Judge O'Conor replied that,
"Whether the Act retains vitality within the sphere in which it has
traditionally applied is a matter for Congress, not the courts, to
decide."49 These rulings effectively denied the plaintiffs access to
the "deep pocket" defendants since Permargo's assets simply would not
cover any reasonable settlement.
The case stalled at this juncture for a year. In February of
1983, Judge O'Conor held a closed meeting with the litigants and Sedco
offered to settle out of court with the plaintiffs shortly thereafter.
29
The federal government and the private interests accepted this offer
and in March 1983, Sedco made payments of $2 million and $2.14 million
respectively to the U.S. government and the businessmen who had joined
in the suit.50 As agreed in the settlement, these parties immediately
dropped their suits against Permargo and Pemex. Sedco, however,
retained its actions against both Mexican companies. The State of
Texas, not having accepted the settlement with Sedco, also remains in
litigation at this writing.
Effects and proposals
In view of the settlements made in this case to date, the
tremendous disparity between the damages suffered by private industry
and the monies received by them in compensation must concern any
maritime businessman. The U.S. government has concerned itself, also,
and several proposals have emerged in the aftermath of the spill.
On the domestic front, bills have been introduced in both Houses
of Congress since 1979 to provide a "superfund" for the compensation
of victims of oi 1 pollution. The money would be drawn from a tax on
oil imports and refinery products and the definitions would be
expanded to include pollution from incidents on the high seas or in
foreign waters. In effect, the federal government would be providing
insurance against future spill damages in a single compensation fund.
H.R. 85, A Bill to Provide ~ Comprehensive of System Liability and
Compensation for Oil ~! Damage and Removal Costs, passed the House
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of Representatives in late 1981, but was not acted upon by the Senate
before adjournment. Though reintroduced with each succeeeding
Congress, the proposal has yet to be passed into law. The major
obstacles to passage of such a law are the preemptive provisions of
the federal act over state-administered funds, the relation of such
domestic legislation to international treaties, and the administrative
details of liability limits and ancillary uses of the fund. These
concerns, though valid, pale before the need to close the loopholes in
our laws and protect our maritime businessmen. As Congressman E.
(Kika) de la Garza of South Texas stated before a Congressional
subcommittee hearing,
Simply stated, the measure is long overdue. The tragic
effects of the Padre Island oil spill would have been
sharply diminished had the measure been acted on affir-
matively ••• the effects of this spill illustrate poignan-
tly the helplessness of the small businessman to cope
financially with the forces of matters over which he has
no control. 51
In the international arena, regulation by law-making treaty is
winning support within the community of nations. In an interesting
proposal, William N. Hancock and Robert M. Stone suggest in a Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review article that,
The problem of oil well blowouts, however, could be addres-
sed at a more 'local' level. Oil rig platforms generally
operate in a narrow band along a nation's continental shelf
or in relatively shallow seas. Therefore, an agreement be-
tween only two or three nations may prove effective in pro-
viding a scheme of liability for offshore blowouts. For
example, an agreement between the united States and Mexico,
or among the united Kingdom, France, and Belgium, may be on
a scale sUffi~ient to provide true protection to the contrac-
ting states. 5
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Hancock and stone point to an existing agreement among 13 oil
companies operating in the North Sea, but an accord on the subject
with Mexico seems a hopeful ideal at this point. with the animosity
to u.S. claims felt south of the border, the only treaty that could be
negotiated in IXTOC's aftermath is the Agreement of Cooperation
between the united States of America and the United Mexican States
regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment ~ Discharge of
Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances of June 24, 1980. 5 3 The
Harvard I nternat iona 1 Law Rev iew noted that "The agreement ••• fa i 1 s to
establish procedures or mechanisms for determining liability and
compensation for marine pollution damage, leaving most victims without
adequate remedy.,,54 Even at such a regional level, much remains to be
negotiated.
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CONCLUSIONS
There is a range of conclusions that may be drawn from the
aftermath of IXTOC I's blowout, from the deepened conviction within
the oil industry that offshore drilling will not permanently degrade
our beaches to the dread real ization on the part of many resort
operators and fishermen that the economic nightmares of transnational
pollution may next be theirs. By any standard, however, the
importance of the conclusion drawn is found in the changes made as a
result. Whether by using the scientific data on spill effects to
justify further offshore operations or by working to plug the legal
loopholes that cost South Texas so much, the lessons of IXTOC I must
be used to further our management of the nation's marine resources.
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